MAX_HEADER does not include the ipv6 header length in it,
so we need to add it in explicitly.
With help from YOSHIFUJI Hideaki.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
TCP and RAW do not have this issue. Closes Bug #7432.
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
RFC4191 explicitly states that the procedures are applicable to
hosts only. We should not have changed behavior of routers.
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Only routers in "FAILED" state should be considered unreachable.
Otherwise, we do not try to use speicific routes unless all least specific
routers are considered unreachable.
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
nexthdr is NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT, the nexthdr value from the fragment header
is hp->nexthdr.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Based on patch by James D. Nurmi:
I've got some code very dependant on nfnetlink_queue, and turned up a
large number of warns coming from skb_trim. While it's quite possibly
my code, having not seen it on older kernels made me a bit suspect.
Anyhow, based on some googling I turned up this thread:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/8/13/56
And believe the issue to be related, so attached is a small patch to
the kernel -- not sure if this is completely correct, but for anyone
else hitting the WARN_ON(1) in skbuff.h, it might be helpful..
Signed-off-by: James D. Nurmi <jdnurmi@gmail.com>
Ported to ip6_queue and nfnetlink_queue and added return value
checks.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
It would be nice to keep things working even with this built as a
module, it took me some time to realize my IPv6 tunnel was broken
because of the missing sit module. This module alias fixes things
until distributions have added an appropriate alias to modprobe.conf.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If inet6_init() fails later than ndisc_init() call, or IPv6 module is
unloaded, ndisc_netdev_notifier call remains in the list and will follows in
oops later.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In theory these are opaque 32bit values. However, we end up
allocating them sequentially in host-endian and stick unchanged
on the wire.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
There's a bug in the seqfile show operation for flowlabel objects, where
each hash chain is traversed cumulatively for each element. The following
function is called for each element of each chain:
static void ip6fl_fl_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, struct ip6_flowlabel *fl)
{
while(fl) {
seq_printf...
fl = fl->next;
}
}
Thus, objects can appear mutliple times when reading
/proc/net/ip6_flowlabel, as the above is called for each element in the
chain.
The solution is to remove the while() loop from the above, and traverse
each chain exactly once, per the patch below. This also removes the
ip6fl_fl_seq_show() function, which does nothing else.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently, when an application requests a lease for a flowlabel via the
IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR socket option, no error is returned if an invalid type
of destination address is supplied as part of the request, leading to a
silent failure. This patch ensures that EINVAL is returned to the
application in this case.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
There is a number of issues in parsing user-provided table in
translate_table(). Malicious user with CAP_NET_ADMIN may crash system by
passing special-crafted table to the *_tables.
The first issue is that mark_source_chains() function is called before entry
content checks. In case of standard target, mark_source_chains() function
uses t->verdict field in order to determine new position. But the check, that
this field leads no further, than the table end, is in check_entry(), which
is called later, than mark_source_chains().
The second issue, that there is no check that target_offset points inside
entry. If so, *_ITERATE_MATCH macro will follow further, than the entry
ends. As a result, we'll have oops or memory disclosure.
And the third issue, that there is no check that the target is completely
inside entry. Results are the same, as in previous issue.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Kirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
There's a bug in the seqfile handling for /proc/net/ip6_flowlabel, where,
after finding a flowlabel, the code will loop forever not finding any
further flowlabels, first traversing the rest of the hash bucket then just
looping.
This patch fixes the problem by breaking after the hash bucket has been
traversed.
Note that this bug can cause lockups and oopses, and is trivially invoked
by an unpriveleged user.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
As reported by Mark Dowd <Mark_Dowd@McAfee.com>, ip6_tables is susceptible
to a fragmentation attack causing false negatives on extension header matches.
When extension headers occur in the non-first fragment after the fragment
header (possibly with an incorrect nexthdr value in the fragment header)
a rule looking for this extension header will never match.
Drop fragments that are at offset 0 and don't contain the final protocol
header regardless of the ruleset, since this should not happen normally.
Since all extension headers are before the protocol header this makes sure
an extension header is either not present or in the first fragment, where
we can properly parse it.
With help from Yasuyuki KOZAKAI <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp>.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
As reported by Mark Dowd <Mark_Dowd@McAfee.com>, ip6_tables is susceptible
to a fragmentation attack causing false negatives on protocol matches.
When the protocol header doesn't follow the fragment header immediately,
the fragment header contains the protocol number of the next extension
header. When the extension header and the protocol header are sent in
a second fragment a rule like "ip6tables .. -p udp -j DROP" will never
match.
Drop fragments that are at offset 0 and don't contain the final protocol
header regardless of the ruleset, since this should not happen normally.
With help from Yasuyuki KOZAKAI <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp>.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Lookups resolving to ip6_blk_hole_entry must result in silently
discarding the packets whereas an ip6_pkt_prohibit_entry is
supposed to cause an ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED message to be sent.
Thanks to Kim Nordlund <kim.nordlund@nokia.com> for noticing
this bug.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
As IPV6_SUBTREES can't work without IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES have IPV6_SUBTREES
depend on it.
Signed-off-by: Ville Nuorvala <vnuorval@tcs.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The fn check is unnecessary as fn can never be NULL in BACKTRACK().
Signed-off-by: Ville Nuorvala <vnuorval@tcs.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
As ip6_route_output() never returns NULL, error checking must be done by
looking at dst->error in stead of comparing dst against NULL.
Signed-off-by: Ville Nuorvala <vnuorval@tcs.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This is missing the MODULE_LICENSE statements and taints the kernel
upon loading. License is obvious from the beginning of the file.
Signed-off-by: Jan Dittmer <jdi@l4x.org>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joro-lkml@zlug.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fixes rt6_lookup() to provide the source address in the flow
and sets RT6_LOOKUP_F_HAS_SADDR whenever it is present in
the flow.
Avoids unnecessary prefix comparisons by checking for a prefix
length first.
Fixes the rule logic to not match packets if a source selector
has been specified but no source address is available.
Thanks to Kim Nordlund <kim.nordlund@nokia.com> for working
on this patch with me.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: Ville Nuorvala <vnuorval@tcs.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch contains the changes to net/ipv6/addrconf.c to remove sit
specific code if the sit driver is not selected.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joro-lkml@zlug.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch removes the driver of the IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnel driver (sit)
from the IPv6 module. It adds an option to Kconfig which makes it
possible to compile it as a seperate module.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joro-lkml@zlug.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
xfrm(s) applied.
The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
"deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
default" in the above case.
This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.
With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).
Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
such as -EINVAL. We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.
The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.
Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).
This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.
This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
with the IPSec policy rule.
Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
is now handled properly.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch introduces the BEET mode (Bound End-to-End Tunnel) with as
specified by the ietf draft at the following link:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nikander-esp-beet-mode-06.txt
The patch provides only single family support (i.e. inner family =
outer family).
Signed-off-by: Diego Beltrami <diego.beltrami@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miika Komu <miika@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Abhinav Pathak <abhinav.pathak@hiit.fi>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Ahrenholz <ahrenholz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
UDP tracks corking status through the pending variable. The
IP layer also tracks it through the socket write queue. It
is possible for the two to get out of sync when MSG_PROBE is
used.
This patch changes UDP to check the write queue to ensure
that the two stay in sync.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The udp6_sendmsg function uses a shared buffer to store the
flow without taking any locks. This leads to races with SMP.
This patch moves the flowi object onto the stack.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Because the system won't turn off the SG flag for us we
need to do this manually on the IPv6 path. Otherwise we
will throw IPv6 packets with bad checksums at the hardware.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
spi argument of xfrm_state_lookup() is net-endian
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
INET_MATCH() and friends depend on an interesting set of kludges:
* there's a pair of adjacent fields in struct inet_sock - __be16 dport
followed by __u16 num. We want to search by pair, so we combine the keys into
a single 32bit value and compare with 32bit value read from &...->dport.
* on 64bit targets we combine comparisons with pair of adjacent __be32
fields in the same way.
Make sure that we don't mix those values with anything else and that pairs
we form them from have correct types.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Al Viro